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1. Introduction 
In  a  closed  economy,  where  the  government  sets  the  optimal  amount  of  emissions  and 
allocates the corresponding total number of permits to the individual cost-minimizing firms in 
an  arbitrary  way,  a  tradable  permits  system  generates  efficiency  if  perfect  competition 
prevails on all relevant markets
2. In such an efficient equilibrium the marginal abatement 
costs are equalized among firms. For a federation-like system of tradable permits Shiell [6] 
shows that efficiency can also be obtained but then the federal government should be able to 
set the optimal total amount of pollution as well as the correct initial allocation of permits 
among the national states. In other words, an arbitrary allocation of permits by the federal 
government does not generally achieve Pareto efficiency. In Shiell’s model national states are 
atomistic agents that determine national production, taking goods and permits prices as given, 
and do not have their own tax policy. This is in contrast with Santore et al. [5] who considered 
national  states  that  acknowledge  that,  by  setting  a  local  environmental  tax,  they  have  an 
impact on the permits price. They prove that, just as in Shiell’s model, an arbitrary allocation 
of permits does not generally lead to Pareto efficiency. However, the existence of a permits 
allocation generating Pareto-efficiency is not investigated. Unlike Shiell and Santore et al. 
Ogawa and Wildasin [4], recently claimed that with perfect competition on all markets any 
arbitrary distribution of permits with welfare maximization by individual nation states will 
lead to Pareto efficiency.  
In this paper we qualify both the inefficiency result by Santore et al. and Shiell and the 
efficiency result by Ogawa and Wildasin (and Shiell). We highlight the effect of assumptions 
on the nature of pollution and the degree of competition on both the goods market and the 
permits market. Regarding the former assumptions, in both Shiell and Ogawa and Wildasin 
                                                 
2 See [1] and [3] for early results. Hahn [2] shows that with one firm having market power on the permits market, 
efficiency of a TEP system is violated in a world where firms aim at cost minimization. This can be corrected by 
the initial permit distribution, an idea we will use in the sequel as well. 4 
 
spillovers are of a symmetric global nature, while in the model of Santore et al. spillovers are 
asymmetric among heterogeneous states. We consider a model where individual states, as in 
Santore et al. and Ogawa and Wildasin, maximize state welfare by setting an optimal local 
emission tax, (possibly) taking the effect of their decision on the permits price into account. 
The federal government issues the emission permits and aims to maximize federal welfare, 
composed  of  states’  welfare.  We  compare  the  outcome  of  this  process  with  the  efficient 
solution, where the federal government can allocate consumption, production and abatement 
to the individual states as well as impose transfers. We investigate the conditions under which 
the efficient allocation is realized in the interaction between consumers, producers, states and 
the federal government. Firms may have an abatement technology at their disposal and can 
have market power on the goods market. The latter assumption is made to investigate which 
deviations from atomistic behavior by both firms and states are allowed without harming the 
federal government’s capacity to attain the first best. State welfare is specified as quasi-linear 
where  welfare  is  linear  in  money  and  non-linear  in  the  final  good  and  pollution  from 
production in the own state and abroad. Apart from the analytical convenience it delivers this 
specification  implies  that  the  issue  of  the  socially  efficient  allocation  of  production, 
consumption and pollution can be separated from the issue of redistribution between states. 
More specifically, transfers between states, organized by the federal government, do not affect 
the  efficient  allocation.  This  can  be  compared  with  Shiell  [6]  who  considers  lump-sum 
transfers between states to be infeasible.    
Given  this  set  up  we  show  that,  provided  the  federal  government  has  enough 
information  on  states’  preferences  and  the  states’  production  technologies,  it  can  set  the 
permit allocation to the states in such a way that the federal first-best is realized. This result, 
therefore, confirms the claim made by Shiell that a Pareto-efficient allocation of permits can 
be found. However, this result holds in more general circumstances than those considered by 5 
 
Shiell. In particular, it also holds for the case of asymmetric pollution spillovers and national 
states that act strategically on the permits markets, the model considered by Santore et al. 
Moreover, perfect competition on the goods market is not a necessary prerequisite for this 
result either. 
However, given the possibly sizable amount of information the federal government 
needs to have in order to replicate the first-best by issuing permits in the proper way, we 
explore next whether the initial permit allocation does matter. In this exercise we consider 
how  (imperfect)  competition  on  the  goods  and  permits  market,  having  an  abatement 
technology  or  not  and  different  specifications  of  the  pollution  damage  affect  our  results. 
Ogawa  and  Wildasin  assumed  that  pollution  within  a  state  is  determined  by  emissions 
generated within the state itself and the federation-wide amount of emissions, wherever it 
originates. Moreover, they assumed the absence of an abatement technology. For this case we 
can  show  that  if  the  number  of  states  gets  large,  so  that  each  government  (and,  as  a 
consequence, each firm) is small relative to the size of the permits market and the goods 
market, as assumed by Ogawa and Wildasin, then the permits allocation becomes irrelevant in 
the limit and the efficient allocation is realized. If firms can abate pollution the same result 
holds. Notice that Shiell in a more simple setting than ours claimed that an arbitrary allocation 
will not lead to Pareto-effciency, the reason for this result being that the Samuelson-condition 
for the optimal production of the polluting good will not automatically be satisfied if national 
states do not impose a pollution tax in their won state.  
For  more  general  damage  functions,  e.g.,  the  case  where  the  emission  damage  is 
asymmetric  among  states,  such  as  with  SO2  emissions,  however,  we  demonstrate  that 
although the permits allocation is again irrelevant for a large number of states, the first-best is 
not guaranteed. This holds whether abatement by individual firms is possible, or not.  6 
 
In the sequel we start in Section 2 by presenting a model that captures the essential 
features of the models used by Ogawa and Wildasin [4] and Santore et al. [5]. Then we derive 




2.1 The model 
Consider an economy consisting of n  ) 1 ( > n  states. In each state i there is a firm producing 
a consumer good  i y , at a cost  ) ( i i y C . Interstate trade of the consumer good is allowed for but 
aggregate federal net exports are zero. The amount of pollution generated in state i depends 
on  production.  For  simplicity  it  is  taken  equal  to  production  itself.  Net  emissions  from 
production  in  jurisdiction  i,  denoted  by  i ξ ,  can  be  lower  due  to  abatement,  0. i i y ξ − ≥  
Abatement costs in state i are  ) ( i i i y H ξ − . Consumers in each state have preferences defined 
over consumption  i z  of the good, reflected in  ) ( i z U , net emissions, reflected in the damage 
function  ) ,..., , ( 2 1 n i D ξ ξ ξ ,  and  money  i m ,  which  equals  the  value  of  net  exports  minus 
production costs and abatement costs plus net revenues from selling permits and transfers 
received  from  (or  paid  to)  the  federal  government: 
( ) ( ) ( ) i i i i i i i i i i i m py pz C y H y x T ξ τ ξ = − − − − + − + .  Here  p   is  the  market  price  of  the  final 
commodity, τ  is the permit price,  i x  is the amount of permits allocated to jurisdiction i, and 
i T  is the transfer to state i from the federal government. The functions involved are assumed 
to  obey  the  usual  conditions  such  as  concavity/convexity  and  differentiability.  Welfare  is 
decreasing  in  net  pollution  from  all  states  and  increasing  in  both  other  arguments.  It  is 7 
 
additively separable
3 in the three arguments:  ). ,..., , ( ) ( 2 1 n i i i i D z U m W ξ ξ ξ − + =  State welfare 
can then be written as:  
(1)  
1 2
{ ( ) } { ( ) ( ) ( ) }
( , ,..., ) .
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
i n i
W U z pz py C y H y x
D T
ϕ ξ ξ τ ξ ϕ ξ
ξ ξ ξ
= − + + − − − + − −
− +
 
where  i ϕ  is the state pollution tax, which is fully recycled to the consumers. Hence state 
social welfare consists of the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus minus pollution 
damage plus transfers. 
 
2.2. State welfare maximization 
State i’s consumers maximize utility subject to their budget constraint, leading to  
(2) 
'( ) i i U z p =  
Define  i i y y = Σ .  It  follows  from  (2)  that  ( ) i i z z p =   and  hence  ( ) ( ) i i y p z p =∑ .  We  can 
therefore  write  ( ). p p y =   Firm  profits  in  state  i  are  equal  to 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ). i i i i i i i i i i i p y y C y x H y ϕξ τ ξ ξ Π = − − − − − −   On the final goods market firms compete in 
a Cournot fashion. With an interior solution necessary conditions for profit maximization read 
(3) 
' ' '( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) i i i i i i p y y p y C y H y ξ + = + −  
(4) 
'( ) i i i i H y ξ τ φ − = +  
where  primes  denote  derivatives.  Interiority  includes  positive  abatement:  0 > − i i y ξ .  We 
assume  that  either  this  holds  for  all  firms,  or  that  abatement  technologies  are  absent 
altogether. In the latter case, called the no abatement case, we have 
                                                 
3 Ogawa and Wildasin [4] don’t assume separability, but this higher degree of generality is not needed to qualify 
their results. Quasi-linearity of the welfare functions is also an assumption made for convenience. With more 
general preferences the point we want to make holds a fortiori. 8 
 
(5) 
' '( ) ( ) ( ) i i i i p y y p y C y τ φ + = + +  
The federal government issues a total of  ξ ˆ permits. Hence, equations (3)-(4) together with 
ˆ
i i ξ ξ =Σ   constitute  1 2 + n   equations.  The  unknowns  are  ( , , , ) 1,2,..., i i i i z y i n ξ ϕ =   and  τ . 
Under  mild  regularity  conditions  we  can  use  the  implicit  function  theorem  to  write  all 
variables  as  functions  of  the  state  pollution  taxes:  ), ,..., , ( 2 1 n i y ϕ ϕ ϕ   ), ,..., , ( 2 1 n i ϕ ϕ ϕ ξ  
) ,..., , ( 2 1 n p ϕ ϕ ϕ ,  ) ,..., , ( 2 1 n ϕ ϕ ϕ τ ,  ) ,..., , ( 2 1 n i i z z ϕ ϕ ϕ =   for  n i ,..., 2 , 1 = ,  the  latter  from 
'( ) ( ) i i U z p y = . For the no abatement case we get a similar result.  
In pursuing optimal state welfare government  i maximizes  i W , defined in equation 
(1), by choosing an optimal emission tax, thereby taking the emission taxes by all other states, 
as well as consumer and producer behavior described by (3)-(4) or (5) as given. The first-
order condition for state welfare maximization reads: 
(6) 
0 ) (
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where  / . ij i j D D ξ = ∂ ∂  
 
2.3 Social welfare maximization  
We investigate the conditions under which state behaviour, described by equation (6), implies 
efficiency. As a benchmark we consider the case where the federal government can determine 
the allocation of consumption, production, net emissions and money to the individual states 
taking  into  account  that  total  production  equals  total  consumption  and  that  net  money 9 
 
transfers should be zero. Aggregate federal welfare is an increasing function of state welfare: 
1 2 ( , ,..., ) n W W W W  with  
1 2 ( ) ( , ,..., ) ( ) ( ) i i i i n i i i i i i W U z D C y H y T ξ ξ ξ ξ = − − − − +  
Social  welfare  W  is  maximized  subject  to  i i i i z y Σ = Σ   and  0 i i T Σ = .  The  latter  condition 
implies  that  the  transfers  account  for  all  interstate  monetary  transfers.  Suppose  that  the 
maximization has an interior solution. Then it is straightforward to see that the following 
holds, with λ  the ratio of the Lagrangian parameters corresponding with the output constraint 
and the net transfers.  
(7) 
'( ) i i U z λ =  
(8) 





( ) ( , ,..., )
n
i i i ji n
j
H y D ξ ξ ξ ξ
=
− =∑  
So, the sum of marginal production and abatement cost is equal across states and this sum 
equals marginal utility. Moreover, for each state marginal abatement costs equal marginal 
total damage inflicted. Note that it is not necessarily true that marginal abatement costs are 
equalized across states. They will be equal, for example, if the damages depend on aggregate 
emissions so that the right-hand side of (9) independent of i (see Shiell [6]). We denote the 
solution by  ˆ ˆ ˆ ( , , ), 1,2,..., i i i z y i n ξ =  and define  ˆ ˆ , i i z z = Σ i iy y ˆ ˆ Σ =  and  i iξ ξ ˆ ˆ Σ = . In the sequel 
this allocation will be called the efficient allocation, assuming it is unique. We avoid the 
expression first-best, because the distribution of welfare over the states still has to be taken 
care of by the transfers
4.  
                                                 
4 The first-best is obtained  if money is redistributed across states until the marginal social welfare of transfers is 
equalized, i.e.  . / / j i W W W W ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂  10 
 
Equation  (6)  shows  a  relationship  between  state  consumption,  production  and 
emissions, on the one hand, and permits allocation, on the other hand, as a result of welfare 
maximization at the state level.  In certain circumstances the federal government can now 
solve (6) for the unique distribution of permits,  i x ˆ  say, that replicates the efficient allocation. 
This result is in line with Shiell’s result in a more simple setting than ours where national 
states are price takers in all markets [6].  
Notice,  however,  that  in  order  to  replicate  the  efficient  allocation  the  federal 
government  is  in  need  of  a  sizable  amount  of  information  on  cost,  utility  and  damage 
functions and on the characteristics of markets. Another qualification regarding equation (6) 
concerns the assumption that states will pass on all their allocated permits to the firms within 
their state. If they withhold a certain amount of permits, the federal government is no longer 
able to reach the efficient allocation. In particular, the federal government is then no longer 
able to affect local taxes in the desired way by the distribution of permits. It can be shown that 
only if the states have market power on the product market, they may have an incentive to 
withhold a certain amount of permits (proof available upon request). 
Obviously, when an arbitrary allocation of permits leads to the efficient allocation the 
information burden for the federal government will be greatly diminished. Moreover, the first-
best distribution of welfare can then be taken care of by the permits allocation. Therefore, in 
the next section we address the question when permit allocations matter. 
 
3. The (ir)relevance of the permits allocation 
In this section we consider several cases that may lead to a simplification of equation (6) and 
we explore especially whether in these cases an arbitrary allocation of permits will generate 
efficiency. A necessary condition to that end is that total net emission is set at its efficient 11 
 
value ξ ξ ˆ = , which is henceforth assumed. Note at the outset that although we leave open the 
possibility of imperfect competition on the output market, from the analysis below it will 
appear that in all cases firms are not able to affect prices on the final goods market nor on the 
permits market. If no abatement technology is available the former result follows from the 
fact that if the federal government fixes the total amount of permits, the total production and, 
therefore, consumption is set as well. This, in turn, determines the price through equation (2). 
It  might  be  that  firms  are  unaware  that  the  price  is  set  by  the  decisions  of  the  federal 
government, so that they still can behave as Cournot competitors on the goods market, even 
though they cannot affect the goods price de facto. In the presence of abatement price-taking 
behavior is necessary for the efficient allocation to be implemented. If we compare (3) and (4) 
with (7) and (8), we notice that imperfect competition on the goods market and efficiency 
together  require  0 = i y
 
for  all  ,   i which  cannot  be  efficient.  In  the  case  of  abatement  we 
therefore  have  to  assume  perfect  competition  on  the  goods  market  from  the  outset.  The 
assumption  of  price-taking  behavior  by  firms  on  the  permits  market  is  a  necessary 
consequence of the possibility of strategic behavior by the states on this market. We assume 
that the firms take state behavior and, therefore, prices on the permits market as given. 
 
 3.1. No abatement and a special damage function 
Suppose there is no abatement technology:  . ,..., 2 , 1 , 0 n i Hi = ≡  Hence  n i y i i ,..., 2 , 1 , = ≡ ξ  and 
ξ ˆ = y , implying that no state government, nor any individual firm can de facto manipulate the 
final goods price  . p  But, as indicated above, we still allow for firms perceiving imperfect 
competition.  Assuming  away  abatement  surely  leads  to  a  more  tractable  version  of  the 
allocation mechanism, but is not enough for getting the result that the permit allocation is 
immaterial in reaching efficiency. So, we make another simplifying assumption: the damage 12 
 
function can be written as  ) , (
~
) ,..., , ( 2 1 ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ i i n i D D =  with  i iξ ξ Σ = .
5 This is what we mean 
by symmetry. Define  n i C p i i ,..., 2 , 1 ,   } ) ˆ ( ' /{ 1
' ' = − = ξ κ  and  i iκ κ Σ = . It follows from (5) with 






















Inserting these (perceived) effects of the local tax into the first-order condition (6) and taking 
account  of  the  fact  that the  state  knows  that  it  cannot  affect  the  second  argument  of  the 
damage function, ξ ˆ, gives: 
(10)  ) )(
~
) ˆ ( ( 1
'
i i i i i D C y p y x κ κ τ − − − − + =  
The prices on the goods market and the permits market can be solved from (10) by using 































































κ κ   
So, even in this very simple setting the permit allocation matters, due to the possibility of 
individual  states  to  manipulate  the  permits  market.  A  specific  permit  allocation  is  then 
necessary to restore efficiency. Consider then the case where the number of states goes to 
infinity. This implies that states are no longer able to manipulate the price on the permits 
                                                 
5 Ogawa and Wildasin assume that deposits within state i  can be written as  j j i i a a d ξ β ξ β Σ + − = ) 1 ( where the 
constants a and  β  are not state specific. 13 
 
market so that perfect competition prevails on both goods and permits market. As  ∞ → n  we 
have  , ∞ → ∑ = i i κ κ  and, therefore, from (10)
6: 
(12)  n i D C p i i ,..., 2 , 1 ,
~
0 1
' = − − − = τ  





' j i D C D C j j i i ≠ + = +  which has to hold under efficiency. All variables are at 
their  efficient  values  and  the  permits  price  is  such  that  the  externality  caused  by  the 
international spillover is corrected, i.e.  ) ˆ , ˆ (
~ ˆ 2 ξ ξ τ j j jD Σ = . That  τ τ ˆ =  can be shown as follows. 
Suppose,  without  loss  of  generality,  that  . ˆ ˆ 1 1 1 1 ξ ξ = > = y y   Then 
). ˆ , ˆ (
~
) ˆ ( ) ˆ , (
~
) ( 1 1 1
'
1 1 1 1
'
1 ξ ξ τ y D y C y D y C p i i + > + = −   But  then  it  follows  that  also 
) ˆ , ˆ (
~
) ˆ ( ) ˆ , (
~
) (
' ' ξ ξ τ j ij j j j ij j j y D y C y D y C p + < + = −   for  some 1 ≠ j .  This  contradicts  that 
) ˆ , ˆ (
~
) ˆ ( ) ˆ , ˆ (
~
) ˆ (
' ' ξ ξ h ih h h j ij j j y D y C y D y C + = +  for all  jand h. Given that in addition  ˆ y  is efficient, 
we conclude that the permit allocation doesn’t matter.  
This confirms Ogawa and Wildasin’s result that the federal government needs only to 
determine the ‘proper’ aggregate amount of emissions, to achieve the efficient allocation [4]. 
This total amount leads to the appropriate emission price τ , whereas individual states ‘repair’ 
the local externality through their own emission tax and, moreover, cannot free ride. Notice 
that we do get an efficient allocation, as defined in section 2.3, and, due to the quasi-linearity 
of the welfare functions this is the allocation of consumption, production and emissions for all 
possible weights in the social welfare function that the federal government might attach to the 
individual states. However, there is only one set of weights that allows for zero transfers. 
Hence, for arbitrary weights the social optimum still requires lump sum transfers.  
We can now understand why Shiell [6] found that if national states take all prices as 
given only one distribution of permits leads to Pareto-efficiency. First, in contrast with Ogawa 
                                                 
6 An alternative way to this result is to take  / 0, 1,2,..., i i n τ φ ∂ ∂ = = . 14 
 
and Wildasin and our model the national states in Shiell do not have a pollution tax policy of 
their own. Given symmetric pollution, national tax policy in Ogawa and Wildasin provides 
the correction to the spillovers. The second difference is that Shiell assumes that lump-sum 
transfers between states are infeasible. That means that the allocation of the permits has the 
double function of providing efficiency and equity. Even if the weights in the social welfare 
are such that no transfers are needed, the efficient allocation might not be attainable. This is 
the case if the first-best permit allocation includes negative permits for some states. Shiell [6] 
and Santore et al., [5] consider this infeasible, because negative permits are considered as a 
lump sum transfer. As we will see later, one can come across cases where negative permit 
allocations  cannot  be  excluded.  Notice  that  in  the  case  studied  by  Ogawa  and  Wildasin 
permits are interpreted as production factors [4]. Obviously this assumption rules out a non-
positive allocation of permits, so that efficiency may no longer be achieved in their case as 
well. 
3.2 Abatement and a special damage function 
Let us maintain the damage function of the previous example but allow for abatement. As 
demonstrated before, in this case perfect competition on the goods market has to be assumed 
from the outset. However, contrary to the previous example, the final goods price is not solely 
determined through the total permit allocation  ξ ˆ and can therefore be manipulated by the 
individual states
7, like the permit price. But already in the previous example we needed the 
number of states to go to infinity in order for the states to take the permit price as given. In the 
case at hand this assumption is obviously needed again to arrive at the allocation of permits 
being immaterial for efficiency so that   p  and τ  can be assumed as given by states and firms 
alike. The first-order condition for state welfare maximization reads: 
                                                 



















































ϕ ϕ ϕ   
 
Using profit maximization by firms, in particular  ' '
i i H C p + = , the first-order condition for the 
state reduces to  . 0
~
1
' = − − i i D H τ
 
This yields again efficiency with the permits price set at the 
efficient  value.  To  see  this,  suppose  0 ˆ < − = τ τ τ d   and,  without  loss  of  generality,  that 
. 0 ˆ
1 1 1 < − = ξ ξ ξ d  Then  0
~
) ( 1 111 1 1
' '
1 < + = − ξ τ ξ d D d d dy H , where  111
~
D  is the second derivative 
of  the  damage  function  with  respect  to  the  first  argument.  Therefore  . 0 1 < dy   Moreover 




1 < − + = ξ d dy H dy C dp .  Hence  0 > i dz   for  all  i.  So,  0 > Σ i idy   and 
n n d d d d dy dy dy dy ξ ξ ξ ξ + + = − > − > + + ... ... 3 2 1 1 3 2   from  which  it  follows  that 
0 ) ( )... ( ) ( 3 3 2 2 > − + − + − n n y d y d y d ξ ξ ξ . Suppose, without loss of generality  0 ) ( 2 2 > −ξ y d . 




2 ξ − + = > y d H dy C dp .  Hence  0 2 < dy   and  0 2 < ξ d .  But 
0 ) ( 0 2 211 2 2
' '
2 < + = − < ξ τ ξ d D d y d H , a contradiction. Therefore  0 ˆ ≥ − = i i i d ξ ξ ξ  for all i, but 
this can hold only with equality. Hence  τ τ ˆ = . So, allowing for abatement under the special 
damage function, price taking coupled with an efficient amount of total permits issued leads 
to efficiency.  
3.3. General damage functions with abatement and perfect competition on all markets  
In the case of a general damage function an arbitrary allocation of permits will not lead to the 
efficient  allocation  if  abatement  is  possible  even  if  perfect  competition  on  both  markets 
prevails. Perfect competition implies that the states perceive  p and τ  not to depend on their 
action ϕ . Hence, equation (6) reduces to  
' ' ' ( ) ( ) 0
j i i
i i i ii ij
j i i i i
y
p C H H D D
ξ ξ
τ
ϕ ϕ ϕ ≠
∂ ∂ ∂
− − − − − − =
∂ ∂ ∂ ∑  16 
 
The first term vanishes due to profit maximization. Moreover, we have  / 0 j i ξ ϕ ∂ ∂ =  for all 
i j ≠ . This follows from the fact that from (3) and (4) we have  i i i i d d d ξ µ τ µ ϕ = − − , with 
'' '' (1/ ) (1/ ) i i i C H µ = +  and  i i µ µ =Σ , implying from  0 dτ =  and  0 i i dξ Σ =  that  i i i d d ξ µ ϕ = − . 
Hence 
'
i ii H D τ − =  for all  i. This can only yield efficiency if  1 2 ˆ ˆ ˆ ( , ,..., ) jk n
j k
D τ ξ ξ ξ
≠
=∑  for all 
k  which would be a coincidence. Hence, the special functional form of the damage function 
is indispensable.  
 
3.4. General damage: a numerical example 
If no abatement is allowed, an arbitrary allocation of permits under a general damage function 
will not lead to the efficient allocation either. We illustrate this with a specific example where 




i i cy C =  for all i and 
2
1 2
1 y Di β =  
for  all  i>1  with  . 0 1 = D   So,  we  have  identical  cost  functions,  but  asymmetric  pollution 
damage  with  state  1  the  only  state  that  is  emitting.  For  this  specific  case  the  efficient  
production values obey  . 1 for    ˆ ˆ1 > < i y y i  Notice that the total efficient pollution fixes total 
production and, therefore, given individuals’ preferences the goods price. Nevertheless, firms 
assume that they can affect the price as they act like Cournot competitors with p’≠0. We have 
0 *< ≡ = κ κ κ j i   for  all  i  and  j.  For  state  1  equation  (6)  reduces  to 
( ). / } 1 ) 1 {( * ) 1 ( 1 ˆ
2
1 1 n n n y x − − − + = β κ  Notice that, provided that  , 2 > n  state 1 will get less 
permits than its efficient production. Obviously, for all other states the reverse holds: they get 
more permits than their first-best production level. As a result, they will sell the permits that 
are on top of their efficient production levels to state 1. Moreover, given  , 2 > n  if  β  is large 
enough, it is optimal to allocate a negative amount of permits to state 1. Hence, state 1 is 
forced to buy all the permits it needs, but in addition it has to pay an ‘entrance fee’ before it 17 
 
can enter the permits market. The state government determines the tax rate by maximizing 
state welfare, given the allocated amount of permits. However, as the federal government sets 
the permit allocation such that efficient production and prices are realized, the tax rate can be 
calculated  from  the  necessary  condition  for  profit  maximization,  i.e.  from 
τ ϕ ˆ ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( ˆ ) ˆ ( '
' − − + = i i i i y C y p y y p . For state 1 this reduces to  1 1 1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ '( ) ( )/{( 1) *}. p y y x y n ϕ κ = + − −  
This expression is positive under perfect competition on the goods market, or if the price 
effect  0 ) ˆ ( ' < y p  is small enough. For the other states the optimal tax rate reads  + = i i y y p ˆ ) ˆ ( ' ϕ  
( ) *} ) 1 /{( ˆ * ) ˆ ˆ ( 1 κ βκ − − − n y y x i i  and this will certainly be negative (remember  ) ˆ ˆ i i x y < . So, 
these states subsidise production, while the polluting state may tax domestic production. It 
does so in order to restrict pollution which will lead to a cost saving due to less demand for 
permits. If the number of states goes to infinity, state behaviour is again independent of the 
permits  allocation  as  we  saw  in  earlier  cases.  From  state  welfare  maximization 
, 0 ˆ ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( ' → − − τ i i y C y p  so that all states, in the limiting case of perfect competition on the 
permits  market  and  goods  market  ,  will  not  impose  any  tax  on  home  production,    i.e. 
, ,..., 2 , 1 , 0 n i i = = ϕ  whatever the amount of emitted pollution by state 1. Obviously, this cannot 
generally lead to the first-best allocation.   
 
3.5. Equal states 
If states are identical in all respects it immediately follows from (6) that the only permit 
allocation that yields the first-best outcome is  n i x i i ,..., 2 , 1 , ˆ = =ξ . Hence, the permit allocation 
matters.  
 
4. Conclusion 18 
 
 
We have developed a simple model of emission control. It has been shown that only in very 
special circumstances the permit allocation is immaterial for reaching the efficient outcome in 
a  federal  state.  For  instance,  take  the  case  where  pollution  has  the  uniformly  mixing 
characteristic of global warming. A world-wide tradable permits market with an arbitrary 
allocation  of  permits  across  states  will  generate  first-best  social  welfare  only  if  perfect 
competition prevails on all markets and the states are neither able to manipulate the product 
price nor the permits price. If one of these conditions is not met a first-best allocation is not 
warranted.  Global  warming  implies  a  very  special  damage  function  as  the  damage  is 
independent of the origin of emissions. This does not hold for other forms of pollution. Acid 
rain is an example of pollution that implies a damage function that does not only depend on 
the total amount of pollution, but also on the location of pollution. If in such a case, states are 
manipulating  the  price  on  the  permits  market  and/or  the  goods  market,  and  the  federal 
government has all the necessary information on cost functions and market characteristics, the 
efficient allocation can be attained by the correct permit allocation, provided the states issue 
all the permits they get from the central government. However, an arbitrary allocation of 
permits  will  generally  not  lead  to  efficiency  even  if  perfect  competition  on  all  markets 
prevails and the states take both the product and the permits price as given. 
  We derived our results by assuming that the federal government is able to determine 
the optimal total amount of emissions. If the federal government issues an arbitrary total 
amount of emissions social welfare maximization with the arbitrary number of permits as a 
constraint, leads to amended efficiency conditions. Performing the same analysis as in section 
3 we can derive that ‘permits constrained’ efficiency (see Santore et al. who introduced the 
concept [5]) is obtained under our special damage function  ) , (
~
) ,..., , ( 2 1 ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ i i n i D D =  only 
with  price  taking  consumers,  producers  and  states.  Asymmetric  damage  functions  or 19 
 
imperfect competition on the goods market or the permits market, generally does not imply 
permits constrained efficiency. 
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